Early military action in Chattogram pre-empted a worse genocide in 1971: Rafiqul Islam

The sector commander narrates his war experience as he joins a special episode of bdnews24.com’s Inside Out to commemorate Bangladesh’s Independence Day

Shoumik HassinMasum Billahbdnews24.com
Published : 26 March 2023, 06:01 AM
Updated : 26 March 2023, 06:01 AM

Retired Major Rafiqul Islam, Bir Uttam, was an officer in the Pakistan army in 1971. Before the military started its vicious attack on Dhaka late on the night of Mar 25, he had already rebelled.

Sensing a breakdown in talks and preparations for a large-scale invasion, the army captain sprang into pre-emptive action. He gave the order to capture the major port city of Chattogram and the nearby border areas. The rebelling army personnel and freedom fighters held on to Chattogram until Apr 2 and Ramgarh until May 2.

"This is how we started the [Liberation War of 1971]," said Islam on a special episode of bdnews24.com's talk show Inside Out to commemorate Bangladesh's Independence Day.

"[We] made tremendous gains in the initial days and our success was such that the 53rd Brigade could not capture Chattogram immediately and carry out genocide. Had we not taken that pre-emptive action, they [the Bengalis] would all probably have died."

The full interview video is available on bdnews24.com's Facebook and YouTube pages.

Islam said that though he was oath-bound to protect Pakistan when he joined the military, he could not stand by while the army attacked his people.

"We took an oath to defend the country, but when we see that country attacking [our] people, preparing for it, then that oath is meaningless. My job is to protect my people. And, no matter what, I'll do it."

The fear of reprisals from West Pakistan did not sway his decision, Islam said. "There are always consequences for every action. And you are mentally prepared for it."

The spirit of revolt had developed in the Sector 1 commander as early as 1948 when the Pakistani government announced that Urdu would be recognised as the official state language for all.

"I was young at that time and I became a rebellious person," said Islam, who was awarded the honour of Bir Uttam, the second-highest award for individual gallantry in Bangladesh and the highest for a living person.

"Why couldn't I speak in my own mother tongue? It became that the Pakistani government was not treating the people of [then East Pakistan], the Bengalis, as equals, but something like a colonised people."

I was young at that time and I became a rebellious person.
Rafiqul Islam

The military is usually slightly removed from politics, but it still influences all military personnel, the freedom fighter noted. And when they saw their own family, their neighbours, and their people at risk, they decided to take action.

When he spoke privately to the other Bengali members of the East Pakistan Rifles, Islam found that many were more conscious of the situation than he had thought.

My fear was that the regiment will attack Bengali soldiers, take over the armoury, and the quarter guard and take over all the weapons. Then the cantonment would be in their hands.
Rafiqul Islam

"It was easy for me to prepare them for war. I said, if you want something better for your country, for yourself and your people, then someday we have to fight and gain freedom."

The arrival of the MV Swat in Chattogram on Feb 28, 1971 carrying 10,000 tonnes of arms and explosives and Boeing flights bringing troops from West Pakistan to East Pakistan tipped Islam that the junta government was aiming to suppress the Bengali movement.

At some stage, they are going to strike the Bengali population. And he realised these soldiers, the arms and ammunition would be used to kill the Bengalis. "My choice was either to remain quiet and take no action, or, take all the risk, and prepare for war. And I decided that the best chance of winning this war would be to strike first," he said.

Islam talked to several officers in the EPR and explained to them that pre-emptive action was necessary if they wanted to survive. He then informed the leadership of the Awami League of his plan so he could get political support for it.

Meanwhile, to shore up his troop numbers, he contacted the second-in-command of the Eighth Bengal Regiment stationed in Chattogram – Ziaur Rahman. At the time, about 1,800 Bengali soldiers were in Chattogram receiving training to fill vacancies in the Bengal regiments. Islam went to Ziaur Rahman, asking him to deal with the Baluch Regiment, the only non-Bengali regiment stationed there.

"My fear was that the regiment will attack Bengali soldiers, take over the armoury, and the quarter guard and take over all the weapons. Then the cantonment would be in their hands," Islam said.

"I said, if you attack them first, take position and fire, then the Baluch regiment will go on the defensive. Then Bengali soldiers in the cantonment can take up their arms and ammunition, attack the Baluch Regiment, and take over the cantonment. In that way, we will get those 1,800 Bengali soldiers, as well as 150 to 200 soldiers of Maj Zia, and my own soldiers … there were about 700 or 800 of them and those who are in the bordering areas."

That many soldiers could not only capture the city, but also the port area, the naval base, the airfield and the whole of Chattogram, he said.

At this time, Yahya Khan began talks with Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in Dhaka, which Islam -- now serving a fourth term as the Awami League MP from Chandpur-5 -- saw as a ploy to buy time to make preparations for the military operation.

When the MV Swat came to the Chattogram port with arms and ammunition from Karachi, the Awami League leaders sent word to the workers in the port area not to unload the vessel. They were eventually forced to unload it at gunpoint, but the arms were still stuck at the jetty. But, on Mar 24, the Bengali commander of the Chattogram martial administration was temporarily replaced by a non-Bengali brigadier.

"On the evening of Mar 24, he went to the port and declared that arms and ammunition from the MV Swat must be unloaded at all costs and must be taken to the cantonment. Those who refused were lined up there, killed by burst-fire and their dead bodies taken by navy gunboats and thrown into the deep sea. So they sent me the message that Pakistanis are killing Bengalis indiscriminately."

Islam then leapt into action, sending messages to the border posts and the other officials in his contact to start fighting the West Pakistani soldiers and secure their positions. However, after he sent the message and went to his planned headquarters, Maj Zia and Lt Col MR Chowdhury arrived.

The two were concerned that Islam had started the fight while the Pakistan junta was still negotiating with Bangabandhu. That the Bengalis would be blamed for starting a war.

Though Islam argued that Yahya Khan was buying time and bringing in troops for a massive assault, they did not agree to join his operation then.

"I told Maj Zia and Col Chowdhury that you're making a mistake by not going for the pre-emptive action tonight and we may have to pay a heavy price for it."

After all, the orders had already gone to the border posts, and the Bengali soldiers had already attacked the Pakistanis and occupied their positions. But, without the troops in training and the support of the Eighth Bengal Regiment, Islam decided to wait.

The following day, Mar 25, there were signs of something brewing in the air. Yahya Khan and his advisors secretly departed Dhaka. That night, the Pakistani soldiers at the Dhaka cantonment took an early dinner and loaded their vehicles with arms and ammunition to launch an attack.

Islam was contacted by some Chattogram Awami League leaders to inform him of the situation and to tell him to take whatever action was necessary. When he got the go-ahead, he called the EPR offices in Halishahar and ordered the start of the operation.

"I said, I'm coming. So I moved out of my house. It was 8:40 at night, Mar 25. That was the last time I left that house and I never entered that house again. And, in two hours' time, we had captured the whole of Halishahar and all non-Bengali soldiers there were arrested. Very tactfully – a detailed operation plan was made earlier and the different platoons and companies were sent to different parts of the city."

By the time he arrived at his headquarters at 11:30 pm, the whole city was under his control, as were the border areas.

However, one of Islam's fears had come true. The Baluch Regiment tore through over 1,000 unarmed Bengali soldiers at the cantonment, while the few who managed to flee joined either Islam's forces or Ziaur Rahman's.

We had great successes in the battles, but we could not hold on to ground because we didn’t have enough troops and we weren’t getting enough arms and ammunition.
Rafiqul Islam

While the rebels had taken control of Chattogram, they would need troops and weapons to withstand a siege. However, due to miscommunications among the soldiers, no reinforcements were incoming. For firearms, Islam turned to India.

"I had to go to Ramgarh and contact the Indian BSF to get help from them on arms and ammunition," he said. "They said you have to come immediately, we will take you to Agartala. You have to meet the chief minister [of the Indian border state of Tripura]. And, if he allows, after talking to Delhi, you'll get the arms and ammunition."

Around Mar 31, Islam crossed the border to India and was taken straight to Agartala to meet the chief minister. After their discussion, the chief minister contacted Indira Gandhi, the prime minister of India.

"She probably told him to give me some weapons and [asked] if I could fly to Delhi. I said I have to go to the battlefield with weapons. By that time, the political leaders … had arrived. So I told [them], now that the political leaders have come, let them negotiate with you. Give me some arms and ammunition so that I can go fight and give it to our troops."

Despite the new weapons, the rebel forces faced opposition on three fronts in Chttogram. Eventually, amid continued pressure from Pakistan's forces, they had to retreat from the city on Apr 2.

"We had great successes in the battles, but we could not hold on to ground because we didn't have enough troops and we weren't getting enough arms and ammunition," said Islam, a former home minister.

"By the time we got arms and ammunition, the city had fallen. So we resisted the Pakistan army from moving out of the city and getting hold of the rest of the country. And in this way, the battle continued up to May 2. A pretty long time -- from Mar 24 or Mar 25 to May 2."

Islam never lost hope of victory throughout the nine months of the war. Part of this was because he knew India would have to take action.

"I knew already that millions of refugees had moved into India," he said. "And I had seen Indian army movements and I knew that there's something cooking up and the Indian military generals - we had a regular exchange of communications. I had been meeting them. I could realise from the moment of their deployment that India will have to fight a war. This is a great opportunity for India. And they were giving us enough arms and ammunition, they were training our freedom fighters. And I was very hopeful that we would win."

In fact, the sector commanders devised their entire plan for the Liberation War in a series of meetings from Jul 10 to Jul 15, Islam said.

"The strategy, the planning, everything was decided on those days."

Islam said the meeting was a significant event for Bangladesh's armed forces.

"And, probably on Jul 15, on the last day, the 10 sector commanders and three force commanders … we were at the BSF headquarters given to our government. It was at No. 8 Theatre Road in Kolkata -- now it is known as Shakespeare Sharani. So that was our headquarters. It was a two-storey building."

"We held meetings in that area and on Jul 15, we all went upstairs. The acting president Syed Nazrul Islam was there. In his presence, we took an oath. We took an oath that we owe allegiance to the government of Bangladesh. Elected representatives had formed the government and we owed allegiance to the government of Bangladesh. So that was a very important part – that it was a regular army. So that's very important from a historical perspective -- that it's not a mercenary army. It was a regular army which had taken an oath to fight under political leadership."