November 20, 2026

Justice: Sunset or dawn?

Bangladesh has weathered many storms. But the student-led mass uprising of 2024 -- amplified by social media -- was no ordinary squall

SM Masum Billah SM Masum Billah

Published : 30 May 2025, 09:15 PM

Updated : 21 Aug 2026, 01:20 PM

It may be late to write this. The storm has passed. The dust -- at least to some -- has settled. But in the spirit of academic honesty, and perhaps an enduring sense of constitutional curiosity, I find it essential to record this development. Not just as commentary, but as a civic exercise that touches upon the future of our judiciary.

Some events deserve to be archived, not only in the pages of newsprint but also in the slow-burning pages of constitutional thought. The urgency of such reflection has become all the more apparent following the capricious impeachment of a High Court Division judge simply for his judicial opinion on quota litigation. More so, the talk becomes relevant following the recent allegations made by public-spirited lawyer Jyotirmoy Barua that higher judges are being forced to take leave, while lower court judges have grown troublingly casual in rejecting bail petitions.

Bangladesh has weathered many storms. But the student-led mass uprising of 2024 -- amplified by social media -- was no ordinary squall. It shook not only the government, but also the judiciary -- to its very core. What began as a spontaneous outcry against executive overreach transformed into something far more startling: a reckoning for the judiciary itself.

The government collapsed. And with it, the apex court. One by one, the judges of the Appellate Division resigned. The chief justice followed, not with grace, but amid pressure. What compelled them -- conscience, crowd, or coercion -- remains an open question. But the concern is valid, for Bangladesh’s Bar is arguably among the most partisan in the world.

In times like these, the line between a people’s movement and a professional mob grows dangerously thin. And before you could say “due process”, everything was labelled as fascism, or worse, the “doshor" (collaborator) of fascism. Even judicial robes began to look suspiciously like uniforms of oppression.

Then came the installation. Justice Syed Refaat Ahmed, once a sidelined judge, was elevated from the High Court Division to assume the office of chief justice. A man of formidable intellect by all accounts, and a product of Oxford’s legal treasure-trove, his prose is sharp, and his judicial acumen commendable. Pity to my limited area of interest: I have not yet read any full judgment of his that delivers a definitive constitutional response or shifts the arc of our jurisprudential history. But I remain eager, earnestly so, to engage with such a work, should it emerge. Until then, my reflections remain trained on the process, not the person.

The pro-reform camp has defended the abrupt change on two grounds. First, that Article 95 does not, in its plain text, bar the president (even when nudged by protestors) from appointing any citizen who meets the prescribed qualifications. Second, that the "revolution" itself constituted a law-creating moment.

The first argument is problematic, as I will shortly elaborate. The second is more troubling still. It echoes a dangerous legal tradition -- one that has been invoked to justify martial law in Pakistan, most infamously by Chief Justice Muhammad Munir in State v Dosso (PLD 1958 SC 533). There, the “revolutionary legality” doctrine provided a veneer of legitimacy to a coup. If the revolutionary spirit -- whatever that may be -- can empower the president to dismiss and appoint judges at will, then one must ask: why are these judges still taking oath under the 1972 Constitution and dispensing justice pursuant to its provisions? Law is not only about what is decided, but how it is decided and by whom.

The route to power must be as legitimate as its exercise. Article 95 of the Constitution endows the president with the power to appoint judges. But even sovereign power must walk with principle. As [British judge] Lord Steyn wisely retorted in his 2002 Neill Lecture, the constitutional promise of independence of the judiciary is not ceremonial -- it is sacrosanct. It portrays a potent symbol of a nation’s allegiance to rule of law.

And here lies the paradox: we are now asked to believe in judicial independence as preserved by an institution whose very rebirth was midwifed by mob-interference. It is like asking a house to stand tall while its foundations still quake from the aftershock. One cannot preach institutional purity after such a contaminated baptism.

Yet another paradox looms in the courtroom corridors: if a lawyer were to challenge the appointment of the chief justice (or the other Appellate Division and High Court judges) before the very bench presided over by him/them, what would that act represent? A bold assertion of accountability or a tragicomic scene in a theatre where the director plays both judge and cast?

The courtroom begins to resemble a hall of mirrors where law sees its reflection, but justice blinks. The higher judiciary watched as mobs heckled the accused in custody and court, yet not even a suo motu yawned. That silence turned deafening when even a former law minister, under lawful custody, was physically assaulted within court premises, and yet, the judiciary remained a spectator, not a sentinel. A ruling rejecting mass-bogus cases? Too radical, apparently. And now, the arbitrary arrest and initial denial of bail to popular actress Nusraat Faria -- later reversed but only after a wave of public outcry -- offers yet another troubling indication that the judiciary is not yet capable of exercising its independence fully.

Let us be honest -- people have long called for the end of leapfrogging culture. But this change, too, was staged. Senior judges were asked to leave the show. Ritual order was disrupted. Constitutional modesty was treated as disposable etiquette. This may be cited as an example of institutionally corrosive practice. It frays the threads of trust -- between peers, between branches of government, and between the public and the judiciary.

Ah, yes, the robe, once a symbol of judicial mystery and moral authority, now a fabric stitched with suspicion. When the robe loses its reverence, the bench becomes a balcony. The courtroom, a theatre. And justice, a performance. What followed was not a transition -- it was a purge. Over 20 judges exited. Some resigned. Some were nudged. Some vanished into the silence of irrelevance. Cleanliness was claimed, cleansing, never confirmed. One is reminded of Carl Schmitt’s chilling sentence: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.” In this curious episode, the Bar, spurred by student protestors, claimed sovereignty, playing jury, judge, and executioner, all in the spirit of the thumb rule, not the law.

But “romantic revolutions”, however righteous in rhetoric, are rarely good at design. They break better than they build. We have seen this before. In Pakistan, the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement restored judges but fractured the judicial soul for years. In Nepal, judicial populism drowned out judicial prudence. The law began to shout more and speak less. Bangladesh risks learning the wrong lessons from both.

What is lost in all of this is culture -- judicial culture. It is not codified. It cannot be summoned by an advisor’s fiat. It grows through repetition, through restraint, through rituals that nourish institutional memory. Once uprooted, it rarely regenerates. Higher judges’ appointments should be quiet acts of institutional humility -- a gesture of patience, of order. That ritual is now gone. And with it, the delicate ecology that sustained the judiciary as a steady hand.

Yes, people cry for justice. But justice requires distance -- between robe and rage, law and lynch. As Judith Shklar warned, the rule of law is not just about rules, but about confronting the “faces of injustice” in reality. Her notion of “after utopia” reminds us that justice must be measured not by idealised visions but by how we respond to everyday injustice. In Bangladesh, it is this very culture of justice -- rooted in restraint and institutional trust -- that is now in peril.

The post-protest coup will remain an emblem of abusive constitutionalism unless the judiciary redeems itself by delivering justice in a manner faithful to the oath it took and the principles it vowed to uphold -- both written and unwritten. Chief Justice Refaat Ahmed now holds the highest judicial office in the land. I hope he wields it with wisdom and restraint. But it must be said: he walks upon fractured ground. The Constitution still stands. But its soul, its animating spirit, limps.

We wanted reform. We got a rupture. We demanded accountability. We received retribution. Any future talk of reform will remain a hollow buzzword unless this episode is meaningfully addressed. For when judges fall like dominoes, it is not justice that triumphs. It is power. And yet, we move on -- unsure if this is the sunset of judicial integrity or the dawn of something new. The robes are still here, but whether they’ll need a good dry-cleaning after every constitutional storm or can finally stand unruffled, only time will tell.

[SM Masum Billah is a visiting professor at the University of Cote D’Azur, France]

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