Economist MA Taslim writes for bdnews24.com
Dhaka, Jun16 (bdnews24.com)—After a welcome period of falling prices the world over, the cost of some essential commodities in the world market are straying northward again. Between March and May 2009 the price of palm oil has increased by one-third and that of soybean oil by one-quarter.
Inevitably prices in the local market have responded sympathetically since these products are entirely imported. The ministry of commerce held several meetings with the business leaders in order to arrest the rising tide, but with limited success.
Exasperated by the repeated increases in the prices, the minister of commerce recently complained that the business people lose no time in raising prices when the international prices go up; but they do not show the same alacrity in reducing prices when the world prices go down.
The consumers, who are at the receiving end of the frequent price hikes of essential commodities, would wholeheartedly agree that the minister speaks their mind. What baffles them though is how it is possible for the business people to manipulate the market with impunity despite the operation of the free market and all the warnings and monitoring by the government.
The most hackneyed allegation about reasons for the price hikes is that a few powerful business houses form cartels (syndicate) to manipulate the market supplies in a manner that allows them to raise the prices. While this could indeed be a probable reason for the price hikes, the trouble is that no one has shown, beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of such cartels, or for that matter how a cartel actually operates in Bangladesh.
The formation of a cartel to manipulate market prices is a serious economic offence that should be dealt with a very firm hand by the government. However, this requires that the government identifies the cartel correctly and takes action lawfully.
If the government resorts to stern measures against reputed business people on the assumption that they are operating a cartel when no such cartel exists, it will do enormous harm not only to the reputation of the individuals accused of operating such a cartel, but also to business confidence in general, and thereby to the health of the entire economy.
The nation already had a demonstration of the adverse consequences of such reckless government actions against business people during the last two calendar years, and does not have appetite for more.
An increase in prices in an unregulated market is usually the natural outcome of the interplay of market forces. Distinguishing this from an artificial increase engineered by a cartel is no easy matter. Almost all the people who hold cartels responsible for price hikes do so on the basis of hunches, preconceived notions, or at most circumstantial evidence.
A small number of suppliers and/or a reduction in the supply are frequently proffered as evidence of the existence of a cartel. But how does one prove that the reduction in the supply was the conspiratorial act of a cartel, and not a natural market outcome due to cost or expectations-related factors? This would require a very rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis, which the concerned people have shied away from. (Bureau of Economic Research, University of Dhaka is currently completing such a study.)
It also bears mentioning that without a reasonably rigorous demonstration of the actual market conditions, it would be unfair to harm the reputation of decades-old business houses just on hunches and suspicion.
The reason for the frustration of the commerce cinister with the business community is evident from the recent bout of fluctuations in the international price of soybean oil and the corresponding movement of the domestic price.
The international price of soybean oil rose incessantly all through the year 2006, 2007 and the first half of 2008. However, it fell sharply from July 2008 onward and by December 2008, the soybean price was less than half its peak level in June 2008.
The domestic price also marched upward in keeping with the international price, and nearly doubled between January 2007 and August 2008 (see the Chart below). However, the domestic market did not respond much to the sharp price reduction in the international market during the next five months; it fell only after January 2008.
How did the oil barons keep the market price nearly unchanged at the high level when the world price was tumbling? Was it collusion (syndicate), or was it a normal market response?
Source: World Bank and Trading Corporation of Bangladesh
It is easy to regard the high domestic market price of soybean oil despite the sharp fall in the world price as the outcome of a collusive act of the small number of business houses engaged in soybean oil import and refining. And assuredly this is always the most common diagnosis. However, the fact that the price did not fall does not by itself imply there was collusion among the traders.
Let us clarify the issue with the help of an example. Consider the hypothetical case of an importer who has witnessed incessant price increase for more than two years. It is only natural for him to assume that the high prices will continue in the future. He accordingly maintains a stock of say 5,000 tonnes of oil at a world price of say Tk100/kg.
Assume that the world price suddenly crashes to Tk50/kg. If the trader were to immediately release all his stock at this new world price he would suffer a loss of 25 crore taka.
Faced with the prospect of such a large loss what would be the natural response of a trader? Obviously he would be reluctant to sell at this low price and hence, attempt to sell at the current high price as long as he can. He may be able to do so since the market demand and supply are already adjusted to the current high price, and it could decline only if the market supply increased (or the demand fell).
Hence, the optimum thing for the trader to do is not increase the current supply, and simultaneously reduce the import of oil to quickly deplete his existing high-cost stocks.
If all businessmen do the same there would be a diminution of the current stocks as well as the amount of oil in the import pipeline. Hence, market supply will not increase. With market supply not increasing there would be no reason for the domestic price to fall. The traders would continue to import less and supply the market at the current rate so as to hold the market price at a high level until they have worked off their high cost stocks.
This way they could minimise their loss or maintain their profit. Once the stocks bought at the high price have been depleted, the traders would resume importing at full steam and sell the oil at a (lower) price that reflects the international price.
Is this story a plausible explanation of what happened in the soybean oil market during 2007-09? The Table below shows that during the period July 2007 and February 2008, when the oil price was sharply rising in the world market, the average monthly import was nearly 35 thousand tons.
The pace of import during this period was far in excess of the average import (or consumption) of 21 thousand tonnes during the corresponding period of the previous four years. The importers were probably stocking up in anticipation of further increases in the world price.
The stock built-up seems to have forced the importers (who are also the refiners) to revise their strategy, and reduce the rate of import to just over 12 thousand tons during March-June 2008 when the world price was still high and rising. As the world price of soybean oil tumbled in July 2008, the local refiners reined in import even more sharply, reducing it to less than 12 thousand tons per month during the July-December 2008 period, i.e. they reduced soybean oil import by two-thirds.
This massive reduction in import allowed them time to work off their accumulated high-cost stocks without suffering much financial loss. By the end of December 2008 they had probably sold off their high-cost stocks; hence, there was a doubling of the monthly import during January-March 2009 over that of the previous six months.
The soybean oil import during January-March 2009 was very similar to the import level during the corresponding period of the pervious two years, i.e. the rate of import apparently returned to normal.
Table: Monthly Import of Soybean Oil (MT)
July 06 - Feb 07
July 07 - Feb 08
Mar 08 - Dec 08
Jan 09- Mar 09
21,233
34,727
11,951
24,056
Source: NBR
But how did the edible oil importers prevent other business people from importing at the lower world price and undersell them in the local market as one would expect to happen in a free market? This is where the peculiarity of the particular industry and the natural frictions of the market, even a free market, become important.
Most of the edible oil imported into the country is crude oil. It is refined by the refiners and sold on the domestic market. A higher import duty on refined oil in the earlier years permitted the rapid growth of a refining industry because the modest value addition in refining made the effective rate of protection on domestic production very attractive.
The capital cost of setting up an oil refinery is very high and the capacity of the optimum plant is substantial. These restrict the number of firms that operate in the market. The high sunk cost works as a natural barrier to entry into the market permitting the oil importers-cum-refiners a certain degree of influence over the market during the short term.
It is virtually impossible for anyone new to get into the edible oil market at a short notice since finding reliable international suppliers and establishing local distribution networks take time. Even the government would face serious difficulties in influencing the market in the short term since it would not be able to act quickly enough (unless it already holds significant stocks). The current importers are thus assured that no new players could enter the market in the short term.
When the international price of oil rises, the domestic price of the existing stock can be raised immediately. There is no reason to fear that some one could undersell them unless there are excessive stocks on hand. Any new importer can procure the product only at the now higher world price, and could not possibly sell at a lower price without making losses.
The government could perhaps import refined soybean oil in substantial amounts through TCB and sell it on the open market. This appears to be the only alternative for the government to influence the domestic market price although this will cost the nation more than bringing in crude oil for refining. The chart above shows that the current market price has fallen roughly in line with the import cost by February 2009.
Hence, the government will not be able to reduce the current price noticeably unless it decides to provide subsidy on edible oil. It can only use its current stocks to prevent future rises in the domestic soybean oil price in excess of the import cost. However, there is a possibility that such intervention could cause temporary market disruptions and hence, shortages or price spikes. The cure could be worse than the disease!
An important thing to note is that the divergence between the local and the world price does not last long, although the most recent bout was a bit lengthy. This was probably due to excessive stocks that the importers had built up during 2007 that took time to work off.
It is interesting that the domestic price of palm oil, which is imported and refined by the same small group of traders, fell in tandem with the fall in the international market price. The import of palm oil in 2007 occurred actually at a much lower rate than the previous three years, and hence it is most unlikely that there could have been a stock build-up. Hence, the refiners could reduce the price of palm oil in tandem with import cost.
Even when the government has taken the policy decision to intervene in the market, it will take considerable time for the concerned officials to fully comprehend the nature of a price divergence, and some more time to decide on what action to take.
Yet more time would be spent on actually taking the offsetting action such as importing. By this time the market price might have already stabilised such that little would be achieved by the governmental action.
In order to ensure a quick response when a problem develops the government will have to hold large stocks of the target commodities. For edible oil, the government would need to hold stocks of about one month's consumption to stabilise the market, assuming that it has a distribution network that functions satisfactorily.
When the government holds such large stocks, it must stand ready to take in large losses in the case of a decline in the price. All decisions on purchases will have to be taken at the political level as few bureaucrats would be willing to commit themselves in such ventures; and it would not be fair to ask them to do so unless they could be given immunity from incurring losses.
Mobilising the government machinery to embark upon projects of this magnitude and complexity will be a courageous endeavour, but there will be rich dividends for success.
Professor M A Taslim is currently the CEO of Bangladesh Foreign Trade Institute
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