Published : 29 Jul 2026, 06:11 PM
Updated : 08 Sep 2026, 09:28 AM
An official report on the 1981 murder of former president Ziaur Rahman has come to light 45 years after the killing.
The Daily Star published the contents of the investigation on Wednesday after obtaining a physical copy of the report.
Ziaur Rahman was killed at the Chattogram Circuit House on May 30, 1981, as part of an attempted military coup. The investigation panel was set up by Justice Abdus Sattar, the acting president at the time, who would later become president. The commission was led by former chief justice Ruhul Islam, justice Abu Taher Mohammad Afzal – who would go on to become a chief justice himself, and Khulna district and sessions judge Syed Serajuddin Ahmed.
The panel launched its probe on Jun 25 that year, working out of the building that later became the Ganabhaban.
“This report never saw the light of day. We do not know what happened to this report, and it was never made public,” Ziauddin M Chowdhury, the deputy commissioner of Chattogram at the time of the murder, told The Daily Star.
Initially, the commission was tasked with investigating whether the assassination was the result of a conspiracy. If so, it was to identify the conspirators, uncover their plan and motives, and examine how the killing was organised and executed. It was also asked to identify those who supported or abetted the conspiracy and to assess the degree of their complicity.
The home ministry later dropped these aspects from the panel’s mandate, instead asking it to evaluate the security measures for the president and their adequacy, analysing any failures by the agencies responsible for Ziaur Rahman’s protection.
The commission also looked into how assailants were able to remove Ziaur Rahman’s body from the spot and identify any related lapses. In addition, the panel probed the conduct of civil administration officials, including the police, for their role from the time of the killing until the perpetrators’ surrender.
‘Practically No Resistance’
A total of 62 witnesses, including then army chief Hussain Muhammad Ershad, were interviewed.
The commission’s major finding was that, despite the measures in place at the Circuit House, the killers faced almost no resistance due to lax security.
“We have not been able to avoid the impression that there was practically no resistance offered to the raiders, and it was just ‘veni vidi vici’ for them,” the report said.
The Latin term “veni, vidi, vici” is commonly translated as “I came, I saw, I conquered”.
The report also laid much of the blame on lieutenant colonel Abu Yusuf Md Mahfuzur Rahman, personal secretary to Ziaur Rahman. Mahfuzur was found guilty by a military court and hanged on Sept 23, 1981, before the report’s submission.
The report also voiced misgivings on another army officer hanged the same day – major Mujibur Rahman – and the president’s aide-de-camp captain Mazharul Huq.
The commission said Mahfuzur was at the Circuit House and was in a room east of Ziaur Rahman’s on the night of the murder.
Mazharul told the commission in a statement that he left his room once the firing had stopped and proceeded by a verandah towards the room where the president was staying and saw Mahfuzur coming from the other end.
“Lt Col Mahfuzur Rahman told Captain Mazharul Huq that everything was lost. They saw the President lying dead in a pool of blood in front of Room No. 4. His body was riddled with bullets and part of his face was mutilated by brush-fire from very close range,” the report said.
The bodies of lieutenant colonel AFM Moinul Ahsan, chief security officer to the president, and captain Ashraful Hafiz Khan, of the President’s Guard Regiment, had also been found, Mazharul said.
“It is found that Lt Col Mahfuz also allegedly opened the door of his room at the time of the raid, as did Lt Col Moinul Ahasan and Capt Hafiz. Lt Col Mahfuz was also allegedly fired upon by one of the raiders who was standing in front of the door of his room. It will always remain an enigma as to how Lt Col Mahfuz escaped without a scratch on his person, whereas the two other officers were instantaneously killed,” the commission said.
It also cast doubt on Mahfuz’s account of bullet marks on the wall inside the room, which he claimed were caused by gunfire from outside the door.
“We have had the advantage of some expert opinion offered by the Police at the time of examining the said room. It appeared to be very unlikely that the said bullet marks could be caused from outside. The location and the nature of the marks are such that the possibility of a subsequent fabrication cannot be ruled out,” the report said.
It goes on to conclude that neither Mahfuz nor Mazharul emerged from their rooms until their doors were knocked on and they were called by a wireless operator well after the killers left.
“It is found that these two Army Officers were busy with their telephones inside their rooms and never cared to come out for a long time. This behaviour of the persons concerned, keeping in view their attachment with and responsibility to the late President, was hardly consistent with their bona fides and sincere conduct,” it said.
The panel noted that Mazhar’s room had a connecting door to Ziaur Rahman’s, but he did not attempt to open it. It noted Mazhar should have been expected to help the president avoid the initial attack.
“We do not know what would have happened if that door was open. We are surprised to hear from the ADC that he did not even know that there was a connecting door between his room and that of the President,” it stated.
The commission also voiced its suspicions regarding Mahfuz due to a request by the officer for typed copies of charts showing who was occupying which room at the Circuit House.
“We have been informed that Lt Col Mahfuz never asked for room allocation charts during earlier occasions when the President stayed in the Circuit House,” it said.
The panel added that Inspector Bazlur Rashid, the house guard-in-charge, alleged that Mahfuz had asked for two House Guards posted in front of the president’s room to be removed around 10pm, which meant no guards were posted outside the room.
The report also questioned the visit of major Mujibur Rahman, the local officer-in-charge of the Field Intelligence Unit (FIU), to the Circuit House during the day and his meeting with the president’s military staff.
Major general Muhammad Abul Manzur, the general officer commanding (GOC) the 24th Infantry Division, had been openly rebelling against the late president and would go on to form a rebel government after Ziaur Rahman’s assassination.
“He had no ostensible business to be there. We are not prepared to accept that Lt Col Mahfuz and Capt Mazhar were not aware of the background of the relationship between the late President and the local General Officer Commanding (GOC), as also those between the DGFI (Directorate General Forces Intelligence) and the local FIU under the command of Major General Manzur,” the report said.
“One expected that there should have been a shrewd suspicion under the circumstances that the uncalled-for visit of Major Mujib to the Circuit House was for reconnaissance purposes with an ulterior motive. It is rather strange that none of them seemed to give any importance to the visit of Major Mujib to the Circuit House, not to speak of putting on guard the intelligence and the security agencies.”
Securing the Body
The probe questioned Mahfuz’s motives in his “lack of initiative” to protect Ziaur Rahman’s body. The body was said to have been practically unattended at the location of the murder until it was snatched by a rebel army faction and buried in a location later uncovered in Rangunia Upazila.
A post-mortem of the late president found that he had suffered 20 separate bullet wounds to the body. The autopsy report found that Ziaur Rahman was shot several times in the face, with his lower jawbone shattered into pieces, and major structures in the neck completely cut through – likely by automatic fire from close range.
There were 10 bullet wounds to the chest and abdomen, two more in the right arm, one below the navel, and a few scattered small wounds on both legs, it said.
The body lay in that mutilated state at the Circuit House on the morning of May 30, 1981, after all its notable visitors – including the divisional commissioner and the police commissioner – had left the spot, with only two National Security Intelligence (NSI) officers left to keep watch, the report said.
“It is evident that they were nervous and in confusion. They were unable to cope with the situation to decide about the security of the dead body of the President exercising their own authority and judgment being under the apprehension that the occurrence was caused by a section of the local Army and that Army men were on patrol. The Commissioner was called to the Division Headquarters by Manzur."
Then, at 8:30am, two army jeeps and an army van with automatic weapons came to the Circuit House.
Three majors and 10-15 sepoys got off and confronted the NSI officers, taking them upstairs at gunpoint. They entered the president’s room, questioned them about “secret papers”, and began searching the room themselves, the commission said.
The panel interviewed one of the NSI officers, then deputy assistant director Abdus Sattar. He informed them that two of the majors searched the rooms while Sattar was left guarding the body with the third.
Major (retired) Md Muzaffar Hossain comes up at this point in the report.
“One of them addressed another as ‘Major Muzaffar', asking him to bring the bed-sheet of the President. The dead body was covered with a white bed-sheet, and the other one also was used to wrap the dead body.”
“They then brought down the dead body of the President with the aid of some sepoys,” the commission said.
The bodies of lieutenant colonel Ahsan and captain Hafiz were also brought down before the three bodies were carried onto the van.
“Once the dead body was taken away, the local authorities had no knowledge where the body was taken or the location of the place where the dead body was interned,” said the report.
Once the rebel government fell on Jun 1, 1981, the search for the late president’s body began.
Brigadier Azizul Islam, commanding officer of the East Bengal Regimental Centre of Chattogram Cantonment, received a tip-off that the body was buried somewhere on Kaptai Road.
The mass grave containing the bodies of Ziaur Rahman, Ahsan, and Hafiz was eventually located on the slope of a hill in the village of Pathargata in Rangunia Upazila. The bodies were exhumed and taken to the CMH.
The probe examined why no measures were taken to protect the president’s body.
“Before removal of the dead body by the rebels, no instruction or direction was given from Dacca for securing the dead body of the late President,” said the report.
“None of the relevant persons, as it appears from the evidence, thought of taking any initiative in the matter of securing the dead body of the President.”
It noted that the chief of Naval Staff and two state ministers had visited the scene right after the assassination.
“The Army Chief of Staff stated that the question of securing the dead body of the President did occur to him in the morning, but since he had definite information that Chittagong garrison had rebelled and until the rebellion was crushed, the question of securing the dead body was out of consideration,” it said.
The chief of naval staff said the president’s personal secretary, Mahfuz, had not asked for assistance with the body and that its disposal required an administrative decision.
“He also stated that at that moment he considered that his immediate task was to alert the ships and make them ready to leave the harbour, as naval ships are sitting targets in the river,” said the report.
The state ministers said they grew apprehensive that the Army might have been involved in the killing and left the Circuit House for security reasons.
Shamsul Huda Chowdhury, then minister for information and broadcasting, said the Council of Ministers in Dhaka had discussed the body of the president, but no decision was made.
Then home minister lieutenant colonel (retired) ASM Mustafizur Rahman told the commission, “in an abnormal situation it was expected that the local officials (in Chattogram) would act as per their own initiative and they would take action which could be discussed and approved at a later stage”.
Asked what local officials could have done, he said they could have “hid the body somewhere” as it was too risky to transport it out of Chattogram.
The commission called the suggestion “ludicrous”.
“We have not been able to visualise as to how the local officials could secure the dead body for hiding it, as suggested by the Minister for Home Affairs. Where could they have hid it? Was it at all natural to expect of them to think of such a step in that morning?”
None of the officials at the Circuit House thought of giving instructions regarding the body, and neither did the Council of Ministers, the panel found.
“The city of Chittagong was in a state of siege from the morning of May 30, 1981, up till small hours of June 1, 1981,” the commission said.
“Keeping in view the abnormal and grave situation prevailing in the morning of May 30, we are led to the conclusion that it was not practicable for any of the [local] officers to remove the dead body of the President from the Circuit House, particularly when from morning of May 30 it became clear to everybody that a coup by the Army had taken place, and the local Army was in control of Chittagong and Army units took position at important centres, such as, Radio Station, T&T (phone lines), and Port.”
“Their [the local officials] helplessness was heightened due to absence of any instruction or response from Dacca. Placed in such a situation, they adopted a ‘wait and see policy’ and for this they cannot be blamed,” said the report. “We do not find any fault with any member of the local administration including the Police for not securing the dead body of the late President from the Circuit House.”
Following the recovery of the body, a post-mortem was conducted. It was then flown to Dhaka by the Air Force. It was taken first to the Rashtrapati Bhaban and then to the parliament building. A major procession was held on Manik Mia Avenue on Jun 2, 1981 for the funeral prayers. Ziaur Rahman was then laid to rest beside Crescent Lake.
A Gross Failure of Security and Intelligence
The inquiry concluded that the assassination of Ziaur Rahman was the result of a gross failure of security and intelligence.
“It becomes apparent and we have no hesitation in holding that the failure of the Intelligence Agencies to forewarn about the conspiracy hatched up by Major General Manzur and particularly the plan of its execution on the date of occurrence was the primary reason which caused grave insecurity to the person of the President and finally cost his life under tragic circumstances,” the report said.
The security forces showed “considerable laxity” in the extent and nature of their measures to protect the president, it added.
The report found that the attack on the Circuit House started around 3:45am on May 30, 1981. The attackers allegedly launched two rockets in quick succession before detonating several grenades. Both rockets hit the room on the ground floor beneath the room where Ziaur Rahman was staying. The rockets were followed by intense gunfire.
Some attackers got to the first floor using the main staircase while the others used the rear stair case on the eastern side of the building.
“The late President opened the door on the eastern side of his room and stepped out of the room saying, ‘Tomra ki chao’? Instead of giving reply to the query, the intruders showered his body with brush-fire from sten machine guns, and the President fell on the floor dead. The powerful voice of a valiant fighter, who loved his people and his country most, was silenced forever,” the report said.
Both major intelligence agencies – the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence and NSI – told the commission of warnings to Ziaur Rahman regarding a possible rebellion by major general Manzur.
“Major General Mohabbat Jan Chowdhury, Director General of DGFI, was asked as to whether he was aware, at any time, that Manzur might make a bid to seize state power by staging a military coup. His answer is that there was suspicion that he might attempt a coup for taking power. He added that on analysis of the situation they considered that the time was not ripe. They never expected that such an action would be taken and they could not anticipate such premature action,” the report said.
It added, “To the question of the Commission, the General, however, agreed that his agency in Chittagong failed as they could not have [obtained] early warning about the move of the conspirators.”
Mohabbat told the commission that the decision on the assassination operation was limited to a few close Manzur associates and a team was formed around 1:30am on May 30, 1981.
He also claimed that rain on the night of May 29 led to a lot of Army vehicle movement inside and outside the Cantonment, which disguised the movement of the rebels, the report said.
Brig Haroon Ahmed Chowdhury, director of Military Intelligence, was responsible for Chattogram and spoke to the commission.
“He stated that he did not have prior information that some Army Officers led by the GOC of Chittagong were hatching up a plan for some time to remove the late President and install Manzur in his place. However, he admitted that it was a part of his duty to collect information about such happenings,” said the report.
Despite indications of an impending attack on the Circuit House, the police’s Special Branch did not make any arrangements to obtain intelligence reports, the commission said.
A sizeable contingent of police were on duty at the Circuit House – including 26 constables, six Habildars, one Sebedar, and two bugles. In addition, three constables were at the outer cordon and three in the cordon in civilian clothes. The entire deployment was also supervised by an inspector.
“Besides the aforesaid police arrangements, a squad of the President’s Guard Regiment consisting of 11 Sepoys, 1 Naik, 1 Havildar and 1 Naib-Subedar under the leadership of late Captain Ashraful Hafiz Khan which arrived at Chittagong on May 28, from Dacca were also stationed at the Circuit House to ensure safety,” the report said.
The constables all had 303 rifles, with the head constable carrying a submachinegun or a revolver. Meanwhile, the outer sentries had self-loading rifles while the President’s Guard Regiment had light machine guns and submachine guns. Captain Hafiz had his own revolver.
Despite the arsenal, the report found the law enforcers fell short.
“We have been told by the senior police officers that in the face of the superior arms of the raiders, the weapons available to the police force were rather obsolete and were practically of no avail to resist the aggression. We find it difficult to accept this line of reasoning wholly. It is true that the initial attack from outside commenced with the launching of rockets on the Circuit House by hand launchers and the firing of grenades from GF Rifles, but the assault inside the building was carried on with SMGs. We are aware that the Head Constables of police and sentries from the President’s Guard Regiment were also armed with similar weapons, ie, SMGs,” it said.
Even posting a few sentries on the staircase with some imagination could have “reasonably well-secured” the first floor of the Circuit House, it added.
“As to the performance of the police force on duty at the main gate and outer and inner cordons, we have not been able to avoid the impression that there was practically no resistance offered to the raiders,” the commission said.
It noted that a storm at night and the nearing end of the night shift had seen the sentries seek dry shelter.
“We have also this evidence that the police personnel, including the sentries, huddled together on the ground floor verandah and Conference Hall and lounge of the Circuit House, looking for a place to take shelter from the rains and rest since past midnight,” said the report. “It is significant that there was no casualty at or near the main gate.”
The main gate was also left wide open all night long, with a private car even entering the main gate after midnight without a check.
During the attack, the report said, “the vehicles rolled on unopposed near the portico and the raiders who kept on firing quickly disembarked, and some of them rushed up to the first floor by the main staircase without any difficulty or obstruction.”
The panel expressed its shock that none of the raiders suffered any injuries from the sentries.
“It is significant that none of the raiders received any injury in the hands of the forces on duty although it has been claimed that about 200 rounds were fired by the Police during the raid from different weapons,” it said. “We have no manner of doubt, however, that much of it was random firing and that too, in all probability, after the intruders had left.”
Noting the death of one constable – Dulal Miah – the commission said, “He seemed to be the only man who held to his post.”
It also said there were no security guards around the president’s room, at his door, or even on the first floor.
“We have noticed that the sentry sepoy Abdur Rouf (President’s Guard Regiment), who was to have been in front of the door of the President’s Room, was found lying dead on the northern verandah downstairs,” the commission said.
While four members of the President’s Guard Regiment were killed and two seriously injured in the attack, they were not found near the president’s room.
The panel concluded that “a few determined persons with due motivation, if properly posted at a vantage position of the staircase, could have successfully forestalled the raiders from reaching the first floor.”
It added that, “in the presence of all the trained men with their adequate weapons and, last but not least, in spite of having all the tactical advantage of defending the person of the President from inside the Fort-like building, there was none to protect the President.”
The commission found that only 14-16 officers took part in the attack.
“Our considered opinion is that the concerned Intelligence Agencies of the Government, the Police and the President’s Guard Regiment, as responsible agencies and departments for the protection of the person of the President, were at fault in varying degrees in the discharge of their duties which resulted in the tragedy at the Chittagong Circuit House in the early hours of May 30, 1981,” it said.
