Despite a tough week, Germany is key to rearming Europe

On Feb 27, the frigate Hessen became the first German warship since 1945 to fire in anger as it engaged three unidentified drones it believed posed an immediate threat to Red Sea shipping.

The first salvo of two SM-2 interceptor missiles missed as a fortunate consequence of what German officials later said was human error – the first drone targeted, which the Germans said failed to transmit a standard identification signal, turned out to be a US MQ-9 Reaper operating separately to the US-led "Prosperity Guardian" shipping protection mission.

The next shots, however, successfully brought down two Iranian-made drones almost certainly operated by Houthi fighters in nearby Yemen who have wreaked havoc on international shipping routes in recent months.

Four days later, the Italian frigate Duilio brought down a similar unmanned aerial vehicle which officials said had approached the ship - all a reminder that Europe is being dragged ever deeper into a growing conflict that it is now racing to adapt to.

Last month, the European Union agreed to send its own task force to the Red Sea to protect shipping against drone missile strikes, a force that will work parallel to the US mission.

But it is the conflict in Ukraine, and the realisation that regardless of whether Donald Trump returns to the White House, the United States is refocusing on Asia and therefore less on Europe, that are truly forcing change.

The last few weeks have shown European leaders grappling with that new reality amid increasingly public rows over how the continent can best handle Ukraine, avoid catastrophic war and coordinate its own defence without always having to turn to the United States.

Since the founding of NATO in 1949, European nations have based their defence on a partnership with Washington – and have often struggled to find common ground beyond that, with talk of a joint European army unravelling several times.

The last two weeks have seen another spike in often highly public disagreements, particularly between Berlin and Paris.

On the surface, arguments tend to be over specific policies or statements – such as French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion European nations should not rule out sending combat troops to Ukraine, or whether Berlin should provide Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv.

More broadly, however, they represent a resumption of a long-predictable tussle for control of European defence policy between Germany and France, one that may determine how the continent is defended in the coming decades.

The mounting violence in the Red Sea is now clearly part of that growing challenge. So far, US Navy vessels – alongside two British counterparts and one French warship – have shot down the vast majority of incoming drones and missiles. But there are mounting concerns in Washington that this is exhausting US stockpiles.

Ultimately, most of the ships passing through the Red Sea are en route to Europe, and it appears inevitable European nations will need to step up their defence despite the mounting risk.

Ukraine, however, is now proving a much more dramatic driver. With US military supplies to Ukraine blocked in Congress, Kyiv is much more dependent on Europe for weapons to survive the coming year – and is already complaining that EU nations managed to deliver fewer than a third of the million artillery shells they had promised by the end of March.

GERMANY FACES CRITICS

European leaders broadly agree that they must fix that problem fast. The last two weeks, however, have seen highly public rows on how to do so.

Macron’s suggestion of combat troops was roundly rejected by multiple Western nations, most particularly by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, whom Macron had mocked for his attempts at the beginning of the war to limit German supplies to sleeping bags and helmets.

By most measures, Berlin has since then chalked out a slot as the leading military supporter of Ukraine in Europe, with think tank the Keil Institute reporting its contribution in the two years from January 2022 at 17.7 billion euros, more than twice Britain’s 7 billion pounds and much more than the 2.6 billion euros reported by France.

But Germany has been repeatedly pilloried for its initial reluctance to send each new tranche of arms, from Leopard tanks to its current refusal to send Taurus cruise missile

[The opinions expressed here are those of the author, Peter Apps, a columnist for Reuters]