Published : 31 Aug 2026, 10:22 PM
Updated : 08 Sep 2026, 09:37 AM
A ministry probe has found severe safety lapses and negligence to be responsible for the deaths of 10 workers from toxic gas exposure at Ferdous Steel Ship Recycling Industry’s yard in Chattogram’s Sitakunda.
The ministry panel recommended disciplinary action against the yard owner under The Ship Breaking and Recycling Rules-2011 in its investigation report.
The report noted that workers lacked gas masks or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) while puncturing the scrap vessel's ballast tank.
The high-risk operation took place on a weekly holiday without a safety manager, ambulance, doctor, or emergency rescue team on site.
Toxic hydrogen sulphide (H2S) gas leaked on Aug 14 while workers were breaching a ballast tank aboard the scrap ship MT Rasi at the Sitakunda shipbreaking yard.
The leak killed nine workers on the spot, while another died later during hospital treatment.
The dead included an oxygen supply truck helper from outside the facility.
Following the tragedy, the Ministry of Industries formed an 11-member investigation panel headed by Additional Secretary AKM Benjamin Riaz.
The committee submitted its findings recently after inspecting the site, collecting testimony, and analysing data.
Publishing the report at the ministry on Monday, Industries Minister Khondakar Abdul Muktadir warned that authorities will take legal action against anyone found negligent in the Ferdous Steel incident.
Where Did the Toxic Gas Come from?
To maintain the balance of the ship, water has to be stored in ballast tanks. According to the rules of navigation, if a ship crosses from one international border to another, the water in the ship's ballast tank has to be changed and “new ballast water” has to be taken.
The ship named “MT Rasi”, weighing about 30,770 tonnes, was brought to the Ferdous Steel Ship Breaking Yard in Chattogram’s Sitakunda Upazila in July last year for shipbreaking.
When it was pulled ashore for the process, all four ballast tanks of the ship were full of water. Since the work of dismantling the ship was almost completed, initiatives were taken to remove the ballast tanks one by one.
One of the four ballast tanks of the ship had been removed earlier. When the second was removed, it released toxic gas, resulting in the death of workers.
The investigation report said that seawater had been accumulating at the bottom of the ship's ballast tank for a long time. Mud, silt, and organic matter were also accumulating along with the water. As the water remained still for a long time, the oxygen level gradually decreased.
In this oxygen-depleted environment, the microbes at the bottom produced toxic hydrogen sulphide gas while breaking down organic matter.
On Aug 14, when the water was extracted by drilling holes in the bottom of the tank, the accumulated gas was released along with the water.
The gas level near the mouth of the tank increased rapidly. The workers there were exposed to a burst of toxic gas and were rendered unconscious. They later died.
A Cavalcade of Negligence
According to the investigation panel’s report, the accident occurred on Friday, a weekend holiday. Although the yard's regular cutting activities were closed that day, a “routine” decision was made to drill the tank in preparation for the next day's work, which was not communicated to higher authorities.
Although the risky work was being undertaken during a holiday, there was no safety manager, ambulance, doctor, or emergency rescue team at the yard.
The workers were not provided with gas masks or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) during the accident.
Even the workers involved in the rescue operation could be seen entering the scene without adequate SCBA. This may have increased the number of casualties, the committee observed.
The report said that although the yard's Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) store had general safety equipment, it was not properly supplied or used for high-risk work.
In addition, there was a delay in informing the Fire Service and Civil Defence about the accident, the force’s representatives told the investigation committee.
Although work was under way to install a new Network Video Recorder-based CCTV system at the yard, it was not yet operational. As a result, no CCTV video of the accident was found.
Discrepancies in Worker List
The investigation committee found significant discrepancies in the list of workers on duty at the yard on the day of the accident and the approved list submitted to the Bangladesh Ship Recycling Board.
The report said that aside from one, the names of the five workers who died first were not on the approved manpower list.
Apart from this, the yard authorities could not show the actual attendance sheet of the day of the accident to the investigation committee. They claim that the documents regarding the external workers were destroyed after the accident.
According to the committee's observations, the yard management considered the decision to puncture the tank a “routine” task. Usually, such decisions are not communicated to the higher management. The investigation committee identified this as a significant flaw in safety management and supervision.
Questions Raised about Gas-free Certificate
The investigation report also raised questions about the ship's gas-free certificate.
The committee observed said that the gas-free certificate issued by Intertek Kimsco had written “acceptable” on the certificate without actually inspecting all the tanks.
The certificate did not test for hydrogen sulphide and carbon monoxide gases; only the lower explosion limit of oxygen and flammable gases was said to be “acceptable”.
However, the report observed that no irregularities were found in the conventional administrative process for granting permission for the import, beaching, moving, and breaking of ships.
In addition, the representative of the Department of Environment told the investigation committee that the yard's environmental clearance certificate expired on Aug 12, 2026, and shipbreaking activity was proceeding without its renewal.
The report also highlighted that the yard’s legal obligation to inform the Department of Environment within 48 hours of the accident was not properly fulfilled.
Compensation
The investigation report stated that the yard authorities have announced assistance of Tk 1 million to the families of each deceased worker through the Bangladesh Shipbreakers and Recyclers Association.
In addition, Tk 100,000 was to be provided to each family as immediate humanitarian assistance and Tk 200,000 as applicable under the labour law, has been deposited with the labour court.
The report also said that arrangements should be made for the treatment of sick workers.
35 Recommendations
The investigation committee has made 35 recommendations to avoid similar accidents in the future.
These include testing of water and sediment samples from each ballast tank of the ship, maintaining digital ballast water exchange reports, introducing specific gas-free and risk assessment systems for each ship, and implementing ship recycling plans with a trained technical team.
Ballast tank ventilation plans, CCTV and record keeping, regular drills, and the use of modern multi-gas detectors have been recommended at each yard.
It has been said that oxygen, toxic, and flammable gas levels should be tested before any worker enters or starts work in confined spaces. During work, it also recommends gas testing every one to two hours and maintaining records.
In addition, it has been recommended to appoint internationally trained HSE supervisors, introduce a “permit to work” system before entering hot work or confined spaces, keep a rescue team outside toxic or confined spaces at all times, and provide practical training to workers and safety personnel on the use of SCBA.
The committee has recommended that a 24-hour emergency response team be maintained in each yard, and that the Fire Service and Civil Defence be informed immediately after an accident occurs.
Finally, the report recommends taking legal action as per “The Ship Breaking and Recycling Rules-2011” for the safety violations at Ferdous Steel Ship Recycling Industries.
The committee's overall opinion stated that conducting risky work on holidays without adequate safety supervision and safety clearance, shortage of safety equipment and rescue systems, inconsistencies in the approved manpower list, and operating the yard even after the expiration of the environmental clearance indicate weaknesses in the yard's safety and compliance management.
However, the investigation committee opined that the results of the final laboratory tests will be important in determining the actual chemical cause of the accident and the liability.
