Published : 02 Aug 2026, 12:00 AM
Updated : 08 Sep 2026, 09:29 AM
Counterterrorism efforts are rarely judged by the attacks that occur. More often, it is judged by what a society chooses to ignore before those attacks happen.
Bangladesh has spent two decades learning painful lessons about violent extremism. The coordinated bombings across 63 districts in 2005, the systematic assassination of secular bloggers and publishers, and the Holey Artisan “massacre” were not isolated security incidents.
They demonstrated how extremist movements evolve: first through ideological mobilisation, then through recruitment, and finally through violence. Their greatest advantage is not military strength but society's willingness to underestimate them until it is too late.
That is why recent developments deserve closer scrutiny -- not because they prove that Bangladesh is facing another wave of terrorism, but because they reveal an increasingly contradictory national response to the threat.
On one hand, law-enforcing agencies continue to uncover indicators of militant activity.
Police have reported recovering improvised explosive devices and explosive materials from Dhaka and surrounding districts. Counterterrorism units have warned of renewed online recruitment.
Investigators have reported alleged links between Bangladeshi nationals and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while separate investigations have examined allegations involving current and former defence personnel.
Diplomatic missions have updated travel advisories citing security concerns, and several international assessments have pointed to the possibility that extremist organisations are attempting to exploit the political transition following the fall of the Awami League government.
Viewed individually, none of these developments necessarily signals an imminent resurgence of organised terrorism.
Taken together, however, they present a pattern that responsible policymakers cannot afford to dismiss.
Yet while security agencies continue to warn about evolving extremist networks, another trend is unfolding in public life: a noticeable shift in social and political attitudes towards individuals associated with those very movements.
The campaign mounted by sections of the Retired Armed Forces Officers' Welfare Association (RAOWA) on behalf of fugitive former army major Syed Ziaul Haque represents perhaps the clearest example.
The organisation has sought executive intervention to suspend his death sentences, withdraw pending criminal cases, remove the police reward for his arrest, and ultimately restore his military status.
Those supporting the initiative argue that the prosecutions were politically motivated and deserve fresh examination.
There is nothing objectionable about demanding due process. Democracies are measured by their willingness to provide fair legal remedies even to unpopular defendants. If procedural irregularities exist, they should be examined by independent courts, not by public opinion.
But there is an equally important principle that should not be lost. Due process is not synonymous with public exoneration.
Major Zia remains a fugitive convicted in multiple murder cases relating to the killings of secular writer Avijit Roy, publisher Faisal Arefin Dipan, and LGBT rights activist Xulhaz Mannan and Mahbub Rabbi Tonoy. Investigators have long alleged his leadership role within Ansarullah Bangla Team, later known as Ansar al-Islam, a banned militant organisation accused of orchestrating one of the most sustained campaigns of ideological violence in Bangladesh's history. He has also been the subject of a United States reward offer for information leading to his arrest.
Whether those convictions ultimately survive appellate review is entirely a matter for the judiciary.
What deserves wider discussion, however, is the broader public message created when organised campaigns seek not merely judicial review but the political rehabilitation of individuals associated with violent extremist networks.
Democracies weaken when they lose the ability to distinguish between protecting legal rights and normalising extremist actors.
That question becomes even more pressing when examined alongside a parallel social trend.
Bangladesh today appears increasingly willing to police harmless expressions of personal freedom while showing growing tolerance towards those associated with ideological intolerance.
The experience of Sylhet headteacher Beauty Rani Pal illustrates the imbalance. A short social media video featuring an old Bengali song prompted coordinated online harassment, moral policing and threats.
Her case eventually generated widespread solidarity, but the episode exposed how rapidly women, secular voices and minorities can become targets for organised intimidation over conduct that would once have attracted little public attention.
The contrast is difficult to ignore. A schoolteacher enjoying a nostalgic song faces public outrage. Meanwhile, organised efforts emerge to seek relief for a fugitive convicted in multiple terrorism-related murder cases.
One development reflects a shrinking space for ordinary freedoms; the other suggests a gradual erosion of society's moral clarity regarding violent extremism.
Bangladesh has witnessed another troubling continuity as well. Successive governments have been criticised for relying on anti-terror legislation in politically contentious cases.
The Awami League administration faced sustained criticism for conflating political opposition with terrorism.
The interim government also encountered similar concerns, and critics have since raised comparable questions regarding the BNP-led administration's use of anti-terror provisions against Awami League leaders and supporters.
Regardless of which party is in power, counterterrorism loses legitimacy when exceptional legal powers are perceived as instruments of partisan competition rather than narrowly focused responses to genuine security threats.
This is precisely why Bangladesh requires a counterterrorism policy anchored in evidence, judicial independence and constitutional safeguards.
The state must remain uncompromising towards organisations that advocate or prepare political violence while exercising equal restraint against the temptation to criminalise peaceful political dissent. Those objectives are complementary, not contradictory.
Violent extremism rarely returns announcing itself through spectacular attacks. It reappears quietly -- through ideological rehabilitation, online recruitment, institutional penetration and gradual social acceptance.
Democracies rarely fail because they lack security laws. They fail when they lose the political judgment to recognise genuine threats while simultaneously protecting the constitutional freedoms that distinguish democratic societies from the ideologies seeking to replace them.
Bangladesh has already paid a heavy price for ignoring early warning signs. The challenge today is to ensure that, in correcting yesterday's excesses, it does not become blind to tomorrow's dangers.
[Jibran Saeed is a journalist]
