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Published : 03 May 2022, 01:52 AM
Blurb: Sanctions will not be enough to prevent Russia's aggression on the international stage. Therefore, it is imperative to develop proactive rules of engagement, like in the Cold War period, when Russia and the West are aware of their balanced limitations.
The recent Russian aggression in Ukraine is unique, not just for being the largest military campaign in Europe since World War Two, but also because during the Cold War, the Soviet Union never dared to invade a country that was not already part of its orbit and that had a democratically elected government. In all the countries invaded by the Soviet Union—Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan— communist regimes were already in power.
Cold War rules of engagement observed by the Soviet Union and NATO were such that they avoided each other's territory and thus averted direct conflict. But what so emboldened post-Soviet Russia that it directly challenged the West by invading Ukraine, a country that aspired to membership in the EU and NATO?
Oblivious to Russia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the general understanding was that the U.S.-centric liberal political order would prevail for the foreseeable future.
Two seminal works—Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man and Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order—have profoundly influenced the mindset of Western policymakers. Huntington wrote that in the post-Cold War period, the conflict would be along the lines of "major civilizations." Although Huntington named eight civilizations, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US and other policymakers came to believe that the major antagonist frontier would be the West versus the Islamist terrorists. They adjusted their political worldview toward a "war on terror."
The general perception of global politics was that besides Islamist militancy, as a rising economic power, China might pose another strategic challenge to Western interests. Russia's desire to return to the world stage was ignored, overlooked, dismissed, undermined, or underestimated. But Putin looked toward the West and saw weak leadership and therefore opportunity.
Without first containing the Taliban in Afghanistan, policymakers in the United States combined the "weapons of mass destruction" issue with the "war on terror" and engaged the West in a protracted conflict in Iraq—the country that had stood as a buffer against Iran, further destabilizing the area.
An ever-increasing European dependence on Russian oil and gas, Iran's growing influence over Iraq, the United States' decision to precipitously retreat from Afghanistan, leaving behind total control by the Taliban, all contributed to the image of weak Western leadership. Putin's confidence was boosted—posturing is part of warfare—and he believed that the West would not protect its ally if he invaded Ukraine.
The enigmatic Putin?
Many political analysts have failed to decipher the motives of Putin. It reflects how much they have lost touch with Russia that they cannot understand the nuances and complexities of contemporary Russian politics or the moves and motives of President Putin. Now, the question is whether Putin is really an enigmatic leader, or does he mirror the dominant views of Russian politics?
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the general perception was that econo-political liberalism would prevail in post-communist Russia—it would follow the U.S.-centered global order and cooperate with the West. The historical presence of strong nationalism emanating from Russia's imperial past is completely absent in this understanding.
Any analysis of contemporary Russia generally reduces to one person, Putin, and everything is explained solely through his eyes. This reductionist analysis helps us to reach an easy conclusion. It provides us with a certain mental satisfaction, that this person is the root cause of all the problems, and that all will be resolved after his removal. This comfortable zone of thinking leads to a suitable hypothesis that post-Putin Russia will be politically liberal and will follow the post-Cold War rules set by the West.
The uncomfortable truth is that although the idea of liberalism has been present in Russia since the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, this trend has not moved forward from the margin to the mainstream because of the strong presence of an authoritarian and ultra-nationalist political milieu over the centuries. Nevertheless, whether during imperialism or communism, present Russia is not merely a replica of a person-centred system.
The communist elites have built a strong political-economic establishment with strong nationalism as the dominant discourse in post-Communist Russia. Putin played the pioneering role in setting up this establishment, and now Putin or whoever wants to be a ruler must align with this power arrangement.
Another uncomfortable truth is that if Putin's United Russia party loses power for any reason, the most likely contender for power is the Communist Party—the second strongest power block in the state. The post-Soviet communists are not the same as the old ones, and they are also deeply entrenched with the oligarchs like Putin's United Russia party. Whether it would be easier or tougher to deal with them than with Putin is yet to be tested.
In contrast, the conventional wisdom is that if Russian liberals come to power, international relations with Russia would normalize and they would follow the Western dictum. This is no doubt an overly optimistic expectation. Liberals constitute a marginal opposition group that would like to cooperate with the West for achieving their political goals, but liberals in power in an ultra-nationalist milieu would be something quite different. Internal political liberalism does not automatically ensure restraint of hawkish policy in the international arena.
The genesis of Russia's hawkish foreign policy
To understand Russia's aggressive foreign policy, we must need to know, as a protagonist of Russian nationalism, what type of economic, political, and world views Putin is holding. Putin's economic policy is centre left, but his political party is undoubtedly right-wing or, safer to say, centre-right because there is a significant presence of far-right elements in Russia other than Putin's United Russia.
As an ardent nationalist, Putin has a positive outlook toward Czarist Russia as well as the communist past. At the same time, he also associates himself with the Russian Orthodox church. But unlike the communists, Putin's foreign policy is not ideology-driven. His external policy is guided by strategic or economic interest. And to justify his policy he uses the notion of "sovereign democracy," where he states that every nation should be governed without outside interference.
This has made Putin popular among illiberal rulers and has helped him establish clout over them because they need not worry about their internal activities if they were well inclined toward Russia. In contrast, post-Soviet, mission-oriented Western policy—i.e., establishing democracy, human rights, and freedom—has placed many illiberal regimes in an odd relationship with the West.
A foreign policy based on strategic interest has helped Putin to re-establish Russia on the world stage. Putin's first test case was Georgia. When he invaded this state in 2008, the West simply ignored it. They not only underestimated their adversary but also were intensely fixated on the "war on terror." Moreover, it was difficult for them to accept that the chilling reality of the Cold War, in which they perceived themselves as the winner, was coming back. They overlooked or denied the fact that Russia had already started flexing its muscles and failed to see Russia's trajectory or to develop an effective mechanism to engage with Russia proactively.
Deterring Russia
Whatever the outcome of the Ukraine war, the West must realize that the world will not be the same as it was in the post-Cold War period. The outcome of the war could alter the current U.S.-centered world order—both politically and economically. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a mechanism to engage with Russia proactively, not reactively.
The West must also understand that simply relying on sanctions will not deter the energy producer and nuclear superpower that is Russia or bring any regime change there. Sanctions did not bring any change to Iran, Venezuela, or Cuba, nor halt North Korea's repeated nuclear missile tests.
Also, the impact of sanctions on Russia is questionable because countries like China, India, or even NATO member Turkey, do not want to join the sanction regime. The EU members do not want to touch the energy sector—the lifeline of the Russian economy—because they are beholden to that energy flow.
Therefore, it is very important to develop a proactive rule of engagement like in the Cold War period, where both sides would be aware of their balanced limitations. Failure to do so will motivate Russia in the future to be more belligerent and to act disproportionately beyond their territorial area of influence.
If both sides can develop mutual rules of engagement, that would help the West to move away from its current sole fixation on Russia. Focusing only on Russia will encourage rogue states like North Korea or Iran to act disproportionately on the world stage, in the same way, that fixation on the "war on terror" emboldened Russia.
