Shibbari siege must end sooner to deny militants a psychological victory

What explains the army's silence over 'Operation Twilight' on Monday is a question being asked by those covering or following the para-commando operation with some interest.

Subir Bhaumikbdnews24.com
Published : 27 March 2017, 01:02 PM
Updated : 27 March 2017, 01:27 PM

On Sunday, two hours before Brig Gen Fakhrul Ahsan briefed the media persons on location, I wrote that the army had settled for a long haul in Sylhet.

Brig Gen Ahsan confirmed every bit of what I had said - that the army was not in a hurry, it would seek minimum casualties, that its priority of avoiding civilian casualties was top priority and that Shibbari would be no cakewalk like Holey Artisan because those holed up there were more skilled and determined than the cowboys at Gulshan.

Brig Gen Fakhrul Ahsan says 'well-trained' militants are making commando operation difficult.

But I am somewhat intrigued by the army's long silence on Monday.

At 11.45 am, Sylhet Metropolitan Police DC (South) Basudev Banik was quoted as saying that the para-commandos are possibly conducting the final raid in the militant hideout. Gunfire and explosions were heard just before that.

But almost seven hours have passed since Banik talked about the final assault.

Around 2pm, gunfire and explosions were again heard - a suggestion that the resistance had not been subdued.

But since then, a mysterious silence has descended.

Three questions are inevitable.

* Has the army finished its operations but will only make formal statement after checking out the length and breadth of the two buildings?

* Is the army still encountering resistance and has not been able to fathom how severe that could be if a final do-it-now assault is launched?

* Is the army mobilising some heavy weapons to take down whole structures to minimise casualties during assault?

Let us take these questions one by one.

This is no 'Operation Blue Star' at Amritsar Golden Temple, 1984, so I would discount the 1st Para-Commando Battalion moving in anything more than what they have used so far.

Rocket launchers or grenades to create holes for an approach should be fine, but if they use any area weapons like mortars, there is possibility of severe damage to the buildings.

Using APCs to tear down structures like in Holey Artisan may also be out of place in Shibbari where the buildings are much taller and more sprawling than the Gulshan cafe. 

Moving in heavy weapons would also attract attention and one cannot discount informers keeping the militants posted from positions around the zone of conflict, much like the possible second group that materialised from nowhere to bomb the outer cordon, leading to six casualties on Saturday evening.

The location of two consecutive blasts, a kilometre away from buildings under siege.

The militants have suicide vests, may have rigged the buildings with explosives, but do they still have much ammunition left after three days of exchange of fire!

If that is the case, either the militants are brilliant with fire control (which usually inadequately-trained militants are not - people fire needlessly if they are nervous in combat) or they had stored huge amount of ammunition in the building.

Para-commandos are usually trained to bring precise fire on targets, they rarely waste ammunition, because they are often dropped behind the enemy lines and have to sustain heavily-armed adversaries - recall 'Operation Market Garden' in the book and film 'A Bridge too far'.

But in Shibbari, they would need to do something to force the militants to expend their stored ammunition - sporadic exchange of fire do not give the impression of a final assault and that may convince militants they still have a while to fight.

This is why perhaps the militant are avoiding exposure, something Brig Gen Ahsan confirmed in his briefing on Sunday.

It is perfectly legitimate for the para-commandos to go for a longer than usual long haul - take more time.

It now appears that the para-commandos might be wrapping up the operations, a final combing of the buildings.

But by no means should the siege drag into Tuesday.

That has implications for future.

If the militants can be seen - and clearly this is a lead television and print media story since Friday - as holding out against the army for nearly four to five days, it will provide them with an aura that may boost future recruitment to jihadi groups such as Neo-JMB.

A commando helps a woman cross a ladder being used to bridge the rooftops of two buildings. Photo: ISPR

That is something that should never be allowed to happen.

In his supreme sacrifice, NSG Maj Sandeep Unnikrishnan wrested away the spotlight from the Kasabs and Ismails who attacked Mumbai in 2008.

An army deputationist to NSG, Sandeep became a hero for millions of Indians - like Maj Vikram Batra who perished going up the last hill at Kargil.

It proved that the country has bravehearts who can take on the demons come what may.

In public perception - and both terrorism and counter-terrorism are battle of perceptions and images - the security forces need to take the upper hand over the militants if they have to generate public confidence in future.

The wailing of relatives of dead policemen and others killed in Saturday's explosions did dent some public confidence. Since this would have been televised for long hours - as channels do not have footage of live action - it would cause much damage.

A long haul operation could be a tactically sound proposition in military terms. But in the battle of hearts and minds, it might end up making a hero of the militants.

That should not be allowed to happen.