This is counter-revolution

Bangladesh’s history is tragically replete with counter-revolutions that have always sought to undermine the gains made in the direction of political emancipation and social progress in South Asia’s youngest nation.

The euphoria of the Liberation War had barely died down when the country’s founding father Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was killed with almost his whole family in a bloody coup. The military rule that followed undermined the secular character of the Bangladesh constitution. In effect, democracy was also put in cold storage.

The counter-revolution saw the defeated forces of 1971 regain political legitimacy or at least a political space to offer its discredited baggage of religion-driven politics. The Jamaat-e-Islami leaders who had supported Pakistan in its efforts to suppress the Bengali nationalist uprising were allowed to contest elections and become MPs, even ministers. The process started by General Zia was continued by Gen Ershad.

As the nation fought for democracy and finally managed to bring down the Ershad regime through street agitations, it got a government that was sustained by support from Jamaat-e-Islami. The BNP increasingly became more and more dependent on the Jamaat which ultimately joined the government when Khaleda Zia returned to power a second time in 2001. So if the first counter-revolution undermined the 1972 Constitution and the spirit of the Liberation War that had been enshrined in it, the second counter-revolution provided legitimacy and political space to the Jamaat-e-Islami and the brand of religion-driven politics it is identified with.

For the first time, freedom fighters with Pakistani bullets in their body had to put up with the sight of Jamaat ministers breezing past, the flag of Bangladesh flying on the bonnet of their ministerial cars. The very people who had not believed in the independence of Bangladesh were flying its flag, with people who fought for the flag and country’s independence reduced to helpless pedestrians.

The contours of this counter-revolution unfolded loud and clear when Islamic radicalism peaked in Bangladesh during the BNP-Jamaat coalition government in the shadow of a global pan-Islamic surge post 9/11. Diplomats, judges, secular political leaders and intellectuals – none escaped the guns and bombs of the second counter-revolution. Slogans like “Bangla hobe Taliban” (Bangladesh will be Talibanised) could be heard from areas controlled by the likes of Bangla Bhai and JMB. That is when Bangladesh began to be described as the “Cocoon of Terror” and as the “Next Afghanistan”.

The landslide victory of the Awami League-led alliance in 2008 parliamentary polls marked the beginning of a turnaround. Sheikh Hasina promised war crimes trials to bring to justice those responsible for the crimes against humanity in 1971 and delivered on it. The rest is history.

Following Abdul Quader Molla’s life sentence, Bangladesh witnessed the outpourings of a new yearning for a secular, modern Bangladesh. The country has made significant progress in social development, especially in areas of women empowerment. It ranks high in most indicators on which the UN’s Human Development Index is based.

The Shahbagh protests gave a new meaning to Bangladesh’s journey to modernity on the values of 1971 and Bengali liberalism. But the forces of counter-revolution are not giving up without a fight. Even as the Jamaat and its student front Islami Chhatra Shibir unleashed country-wide violence, a new fundamentalist force appeared from the shadows.

The Hifazat-e Islam, that has gained some confidence by staging a Chittagong-Dhaka Long March, represents the latest face of fundamentalist reaction in Bangladesh. The patronage showered on it by the BNP, Jamaat and even the Jatiya Party goes to show how much the discredited forces of reaction are now banking on the latest incarnation of Taliban on the soil of Bangladesh. A force that thrives on the most illogical of objectives – stop public mixing of sexes.

On previous occasions, the forces of counter-revolution surfaced after the Awami League was ousted from power. On this occasion, the forces of counter-revolution have reared its head with the Awami League very much in power. It will therefore very much depend on how Hasina’s government handles this force of counter-revolution. The forces of fundamentalist reaction are never amenable to dialogue and compromise. They want their own medieval vision imposed on society regardless of whether the society is prepared to accept it. In Bangladesh, the Hifazat or its allies in the Islamic right are a minority but they would not hesitate to use terror and coercion to impose their ‘Afghan’ version on home soil.

This is a crucial moment in Bangladesh’s history. Forty-two years after its independence, after it has made considerable social and economic progress, when it has proved right the Bangabandhu’s decision to break away from Pakistan, Bangladesh is again held hostage by the defeated forces of 1971 boosted by the Afghan variant of Bengali Taliban. Shahbagh has defined the process of the new revolution and its spokesmen has called for a “second War of independence’.

Hifazat denotes the latest shape of counter-revolution. The battle lines are clearly drawn. Governance imposes certain limitations but if it is reduced to an abject surrender to the spirit of counter-revolution, it will only take the country back to the medieval ages and undo all the progress Bangladesh can be rightly proud of.